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The Hamburg Rules: A Comparative Analysis
D. E. MuRRAY*
INTODUCTION
The new "Hamburg Rules",1 which are designed to govern inter-
national carriage of goods by sea, are intended to take the place of
the Hague Rules, 2 exemplified in the American facsimile, the Carriage
of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA).' Although the Hamburg Rules grew
out of the Hague Rules, it can be observed that the Hamburg Rules
also derive some of their concepts from the Warsaw Convention ' (as
amended)" governing international air transportation.
This article is designed to analyze the new Hamburg Rules and
to compare their provisions with those of the existing Hague Rules
(COGSA), including some of its case law progeny, and with the
original Warsaw Convention, the 1955 Hague amendments to the
Warsaw Convention (Warsaw-Hague), and selected sections of the
Uniform Commercial Code, the United States Interstate Commerce
Act,' and United States statutes limiting liability of ship owners.7
INTERPRETATION OF THE HAMBURG RULES
Hamburg provides that "[iln the interpretation and application
of the provisions of this Convention regard shall be had to its inter-
national character and to the need to promote uniformity."' The
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law.
1. Final Act of the United Nations Conference on the Carriage of Goods
by Sea of March 30, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 608-31 (1978) (hereinafter cited as
Hamburg).
2. International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating
to Bills of Lading (Hague Rules), August 25, 1924, 120 L.N.T.S. 157 (herein-
after cited as Hague Rules).
3. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315 (1970). In most essentials, COGSA is textu-
ally equivalent to the Hague Rules.
4. Warsaw Convention, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000,
T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 (hereinafter cited as Warsaw).
5. The Hague Protocol to The Warsaw Convention, opened for signature
Sept. 28, 1955, 478 L.N.T.S. 371 (hereinafter cited as Warsaw-Hague). Text
taken from LoRD McNAIR, THE LAW OF THE Aia 501-16 (3rd ed. 1964). The
Hague Protocol contains only amendments to the Warsaw Convention, and any
parts which are not so amended are not to be found within the Protocol.
6. See notes 81 and 88 infra.
7. See notes 165 and 168 infra.
8. See Hamburg, supra note 1, at art. 3.
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Convention is "in a single original, of which the Arabic, Chinese,
English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic.'" '
One wonders whether the drafters' goal for uniformity will be reached
when a Convention is written in six different languages.
On the other hand, the provision that each language is equally
authentic avoids the dilemma posed by the Warsaw Convention,
which was written only in French "0 and then improperly translated
in many respects in England and the United States, with the result
that courts have had to resort to dictionaries and to schoolboy French
in order to interpret its terms." Under such an approach, non-
uniformity prevails. No matter which approach is chosen, however, it
appears that uniformity is a Utopian goal over the following years,
unless one or two forums only are selected for dispute settlement in
the vast majority of the bills of lading used in international trade. 2
SCOPE OF APPLICATION
Under the Hamburg Convention, the Rules will govern all con-
tracts of carriage by sea between two different countries if either the
port of loading, the port of discharge, or one of the optional ports of
discharge is the actual port of discharge, and such port is located in
a contracting state." The Rules will also apply if the bill of lading
is issued in a contracting state, or the bill of lading provides that the
Hamburg Rules are to govern the contract of shipment. Let us
assume that a bill of lading is issued in a contracting state, and the
shipment is to be discharged in an American port which is governed
by the Hague Rules. (COGSA). Which rules will apply-Hamburg
or COGSA? If suit were brought in a court in the United States, the
Hague Rules (COGSA) would control. 4 On the other hand, if suit
were brought in the first contracting state, the Hamburg Rules would
control. A delightful conflicts question thus arises.
9. Id. at art. 34, § 2. The preamble to the Convention also repeats much
of this language.
10. See Warsaw, supra note 4, at art. 36. The Hague Protocol (Warsaw-
Hague) is also drafted solely in French. See note 5 supra.
11. See, e.g., Corocraft, Ltd. and Vendome Jewels, Ltd. v. Pan American
Airways, Inc., [1968] 2 Lloyd's List L.R. 459; Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines,
[1977] 2 Lloyd's List L.B. 184.
12. See Hamburg, supra note 1, at art. 21, § 1(d). This provision permits
a limited choice to contract for a particular forum.
13. Id. at art. 2.
14. See COGSA, supra note 3, at § 1305.
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The COGSA rules provide that they "shall not be applicable to
charter parties; but if bills of lading are issued in the case of a ship
under a charter party, they [meaning the bills of lading] shall comply
with the terms of this Act."15  This wording has been changed dra-
matically under the Hamburg Rules which provide:
The provisions of this Convention are not applicable to charter
parties. However, where a bill of lading is issued pursuant to a
charter party, the provisions of the Convention apply to such a bill
of lading if it governs the relation between the carrier and the
holder of the bill of lading not being the charterer 16 (emphasis
added).
Under Hamburg, it appears that only when third parties are
holders of the bills of lading will the Rules govern. It seems permis-
sible for the parties to incorporate the Hamburg Rules into the bill of
lading by contractual reference."
Under COGSA, the carrier is liable for damage (if liable at all)
only for the period from the time when the goods are loaded on board
the ship to the time when they are discharged from the ship. It is
common to say that the carrier is liable only from tackle to tackle."6
COGSA further provides that the parties can, by contract, agree
to the liability of the ship for custody and handling of goods prior to
loading and subsequent to discharge from the ship on which the goods
are carried. As a practical matter, many bills of lading do provide
15. Id.
16. See Hamburg, supra note 1, at art. 2, § 3.
17. Article 28 of the Hamburg Rules states:
Any stipulation in a contract of carriage by sea, in a bill of lading, or
in any other document evidencing the contract of carriage by sea is
null and void to the extent that it derogates, directly or indirectly, from
the provisions of this Convention. The nullity of such a stipulation
does not affect the validity of the other provisions of the contract or
document of which it forms a part.
A quick reading of this provision would seem to indicate that the Hamburg
Rules could not be applied by contract to a bill of lading issued to a charterer
of the vessel because this would be in derogation of the Convention. On the
other hand, since Hamburg has declined jurisdiction over bills of lading issued
by a ship to the charterer, Hamburg should have no concern as to what private
parties have chosen to do by contract; the contract does not truly derogate
from the Hamburg Rules because Hamburg has chosen not to interfere with
their private arrangements. Further, the use of the word derogate, which
means to take away from or lessen the force of, would seem to indicate that if
the parties have agreed to extend the reach of Hamburg by contract, they have
not lessened its reach but have rather increased it.
18. W. TETLEY, MARUNE CA.RcO CLAIMS 10-11 (2d ed. 1978).
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for the responsibility of the carrier prior to loading and subsequent
to discharge, and at the same time, the limitation of liability pro-
visions of COGSA are also adopted for this "prior to and subsequent
to" period. In effect, the carrier assumes liability, but at a reduced
rate."0 The Hamburg Rules represent a dramatic change from the
COGSA provisions in this regard. Under Hamburg, the carrier is
liable from the time it takes possession of the goods until it does one
of the following: (1) delivers the goods to the consignee; (2) puts
them at the disposal of the consignee in accordance with the contract,
the law, or the usage of the particular trade applicable at the port
of discharge; or (3) hands over the goods to a third party or au-
thority which by operation of law or regulations applicable at the
port of discharge is required to receive the goods.20 Now it is not a
question of contract liability, but rather a question of Convention
liability which arises.
It is obvious that the Hamburg Rules have deliberately, or per-
haps inadvertently, copied the Harter Act,2 ' which provides that the
carrier is liable from the time it takes possession of the goods until it
delivers the goods to the consignee. Hamburg, in a sense, is simply
codifying American practice under the Harter Act. In a similar vein,
Warsaw-Hague states that the air carrier is liable for damage or loss
to cargo during the "carriage by air",22 which is defined as the period
"during which ...cargo is in charge of the carrier, whether in an
airport or on board an aircraft, or, in the case of a landing outside an
airport, in any place whatsoever."23
Carrier-Shipper Liability
This Hamburg rule has a startling omission, however. Article
4 provides that "[i]n paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, reference to
the carrier or to the consignee means, in addition to the carrier or the
consignee, the servants or agents respectively of the carrier or the
consignee."24  No reference in this subsection is made to the concept
of independent contractors, such as independent warehousemen and
stevedoring concerns. Unless the word agent can be interpreted to
19. The carrier, without this contractual adoption of COGSA, would be
liable as a bailee without any ceiling of liability.
20. See Hamburg, supra note 1, at art. 4, § 2.
21. 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-196 (1970).
22. See Warsaw-Hague, supra note 5, at art. 18, § 1.
23. Id. at art. 18, § 2.
24. See Hamburg, supra note 1, at art. 4, § 3.
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include independent contractors, this provision creates an omission
from the standpoint of liability.2
It is well known that the Hague Rules (COGSA) were designed
primarily to immunize the carrier from liability for a number of
reasons,2 while the Hamburg Rules have taken exactly the opposite
approach.27  To illustrate the difference between COGSA and
Hamburg, let us assume a case involving negligence in the navigation
of a ship by one of its officers. Under COGSA, the carrier would not
be liable for such errors in navigation. 28  Under the Hamburg Rules,
however, the carrier may be liable if it is unable to show that the
carrier, its servants, or agents took all measures that could reasonably
be required to avoid the occurrence. If there was negligence by any
officer or agent, the ship would then be unable to demonstrate that
all measures that could reasonably be required were taken to avoid
the navigational error, and liability would follow. 29
For some reason, the old fire exception 0 from liability has been
preserved. For example, Hamburg says that "[the carrier is liable
for loss of or damage to the goods or delay in delivery caused by
fire, if the claimant proves that the fire arose from fault or neglect on
the part of the carrier, his servants or agents." 1  This is similar to
COGSA which provides that the carrier will not be liable for fire
"unless caused by the actual fault or privity of the carrier." 2  The
Hamburg Rules go on to provide that the carrier will be liable
for such loss, damage or delay in delivery which is proved by the
claimant to have resulted from the fault or neglect of the carrier,
his servants or agents, in taking all measures that could reasonably
25. See note 51 infra and accompanying text.
26. See COGSA, supra note 3, at § 1304.
27. The basis for the liability provision of Hamburg was obviously based
upon a similar provision in the Hague amendments to the Warsaw Convention.
The Warsaw Convention states that "lt]he carrier shall not be liable if he
proves that he and his servants or agents have taken all necessary measures to
avoid the damage or that it was impossible for him or them to take such
measures." See Warsaw Convention, supra note 4 at art. 20. Hamburg states
that "[ihe carrier is liable for loss resulting from loss of or damage to the goods,
as well as from delay in delivery, . . . unless the carrier proves that he, his
servants or agents took all measures that could reasonably be required to avoid
the occurrence and its consequences." See Hamburg, supra note 1, at art. 5, § 1.
28. See COGSA, supra note 3, at § 1304(2) (a).
29. See Hamburg, supra note 1, at art. 5, § 1.
30. 46 U.S.C. § 182 (1970) derived from an act of 1851, c. 43, § 1, 9 Stat.
635.
31. See Hamburg, supra note 1, at art. 5, § 4(a) (1).
32. See COGSA, supra note 3, at § 1304(2) (b).
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be required to put out the fire and avoid or mitigate its con-
sequences. 33
Reading these two sections together, it appears that if a fire arose
without fault, the ship would not be liable unless it failed to take all
measures that could reasonably be required to put out the fire; con-
versely, if the fire arose from the fault or neglect of the carrier, its
servants, or agents, liability would follow.
Under the Hague Rules (COGSA), live animals are not to be
deemed as goods, therefore, the carrier would not be liable to the
shipper. 4  The Hamburg Rules, on the other hand, provide that
goods include live animalsU and "[w]ith respect to live animals, the
carrier is not liable for loss, damage or delay in delivery resulting from
any special risks inherent in that kind of carriage.""6 The same section
purports to cover the burden of proof:
If the carrier proves that he has complied with any special instruc-
tions given to him by the shipper respecting the animals and that,
in the circumstances of the case, the loss, damage or delay in
delivery could be attributed to such risks, it is presumed that the
loss, damage or delay in delivery was so caused, unless there is
proof that all or a part of the loss, damage or delay in delivery
resulted from fault or neglect on the part of the carrier, his ser-
vants or agentsA7
A remarkable bit of drafting was evidenced in the Convention's
adoption of Annex II which states:
It is the common understanding that the liability of the carrier
under this Convention is based on the principle of presumed fault
or neglect. This means that, as a rule, the burden of proof rests
on the carrier but, with respect to certain cases, the provisions of
the Convention modify this rule. 8
Under this something-for-everyone rule, it appears that the shipper
has the "burden of proof' (apparently the burden of persuasion) in
cases involving fire loss caused by the fault or neglect of the carrier,"9
the failure of the carrier to take all measures to put out a fire and
33. See Hamburg, supra note 1, at art. 5, § 4(a) (11).
34. See COGSA, supra note 3, at § 1301(c).
35. See Hamburg, supra note 1, at art. 1, § 5.
36. Id. at art. 5, § 5.
37. Id.
38. Id. at Annex II.
39. Id. at art. 5, § 4(a)(1).
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avoid or mitigate its consequences,4" and intentional or reckless con-
duct by the carrier causing harm to the goods."' In addition, it ap-
pears that the shipper has the burden of proof in loss or injury to live
animals after the carrier has proved that "the loss, damage or delay
in delivery could be attributed to such [special] risks" inherent in that
kind of carriage. In this case, "it is presumed that the loss . . . was
so caused, unless there is proof that all or a part of the loss, damage
or delay in delivery resulted from fault or neglect on the part of the
carrier, his servants or agents." 42
Comparative Negligence
The Hamburg Rules include a rather poorly articulated notion of
comparative negligence:
Where fault or neglect on the part of the carrier, his servants or
agents combines with another cause to produce loss, damage or
delay in delivery the carrier is liable only to the extent that the
loss, damage or delay in delivery is attributable to such fault
or neglect, provided that the carrier proves the amount of the
loss, damage or delay in delivery not attributable thereto.43
Although it is not entirely clear, it appears that this particular
comparative negligence concept would be applicable to the negligence
of the shipper as contrasted with any negligence on the part of the
carrier. It could also apply, apparently, if there was an act of God,
force majeure, or an act of a third party which contributed to the loss.
Under the Warsaw Convention, it is clearly stated that if the
carrier proves that the damage was caused by, or contributed to by
the negligence of the injured person, the court might, in accordance
with the provisions of its own law, exonerate -the carrier wholly or
partly from its liability." The Warsaw-Hague Rule is exactly the
same,4  Warsaw and Warsaw-Hague thus leave the comparative al-
location to the parochial law of the court trying the case, while
Hamburg foists a comparative negligence theory on all courts, wherein
it may frequently be a foreign concept.
40. Id. at art. 5, § 4(a)(11).
41. Id. at art. 8.
42. Id. at art. 5, § 5.
43. Id. at art. 5, § 7.
44. See Warsaw, supra note 4, at art. 21.
45. Id.
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Hamburg has also preserved the historical notion that -the carrier
is not liable, except in general average, 4 where loss, damage or delay
in delivery resulted from measures to save life or from reasonable
measures to save property at sea. It is to be noted that under the
Hamburg Rules, the carrier might well be liable for general average
to the shipper in the case of a deviation to save life or property, while
under COGSA, the carrier would not be liable for any general average
or any other kind of liability in such an instance.47
CAUSES OF ACTION
On occasion, it has been asserted that where liability is limited
by a convention or statute concerning contracts, one may circumvent
the limitation of liability by suing in tort, or to use the old expression,
"you may waive the contract and sue in tort."'48  Hamburg disposes
of this ploy by providing that the defenses of the Convention apply in
any action, whether the action is founded in contract, tort, or other-
wise."0 Subsection 2 of this Article, however, is not so neatly phrased
and states:
If such an action is brought against a servant or agent of the
carrier, such servant or agent, if he proves that he acted within
the scope of his employment, is entitled to avail himself of the
defences and limits of liability which the carrier is entitled to
invoke under this Convention.50
It seems clear that if suit were brought against a crew member or
officer, such person would be protected by this clause, provided he
was acting within the scope of his employment. This would also
apply, apparently, to any other agent, but would it apply to an in-
dependent contractor, such as a warehouseman or a stevedoring firm?
A tremendous amount of litigation has been engendered both in
the United States and overseas by the application of the so-called
46. General Average Contribution is defined as follows:
A contribution by all parties in a sea adventure to make good loss
sustained by one of their number on account of sacrifices voluntarily
made of ship or cargo to save residue and lives of those on board
from an impending peril or for extraordinary expenses necessarily in-
curred by one or more of the parties for the general benefit of all the
interests embarked in the enterprise.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 813 (4th ed. 1968).
47. See COGSA, supra note 3, at §§ 1304(2) (1) and (4).
48. See generally W.L. PROSSER, TORTS, 639-43 (3rd ed. 1964).
49. See Hamburg, .umpra note 1, at art. 7.
50. Id. at art. 7, § 2.
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Himalaya Clause, '" which by contract in the bill of lading attempts to
equate the stevedore and/or warehouseman or other independent
contractors as a carrier in order to extend the umbrella of protection
to them. 2  Query: Under the Hamburg Rules, would it be possible
by contract to continue this practice of using the Himalaya Clause
as a means of protecting the limit of liability of independent con-
tractors? It is difficult to understand why the draftsmen failed to
deal with this very current, worldwide problem.
Hamburg addresses a touchy problem; that is, can there be double
liability if there is more than one defendant, for example, the ship
and the stevedoring company.5 3 The cases are split under the Hague
Rules (COGSA) in the United States,54 whereas the Hamburg Rules
provide that: "[e]xcept as provided in art. 8, the aggregate of the
amounts recoverable from the carrier and from any persons referred
to in paragraph 2 of this Article shall not exceed the limits of lia-
bility provided for in this Convention."5 This clause should prevent
any possibility of a double, triple, or quadruple recovery, depending
upon the number of possible defendants, assuming that the stevedore
and warehouseman come within the phrase "servant or agent." 6
WILLFUL MISCONDUCT
The Warsaw Convention provides that the air carrier shall not
be entitled to limit its liability if the damage is caused by willful
misconduct or by such default on its part as, in accordance with the
law of the court to which the case is submitted, is considered to be
equivalent to willful misconduct. The official French version uses
the word dol which has been translated, perhaps incorrectly, as being
willful misconduct." This notion of willful misconduct implies that
51. The Himalaya Clause is a type of provision usually found in a bill of
lading which attempts to include all independent contractors within the meaning
of "carrier" so as to limit their liability under the governing statutory provisions.
The clause takes its name from the ship involved in the action wherein the
question of the legality of this type of provision was first adjudicated.
52. See Murray, The Warehouseman's and Carrier's Liabilty far Theft by
Their Employees in England and the United States, 39 U. FrrTr. L. REV. 707,
733-35 (1978).
53. See Hamburg, supra note 1, at art. 7, § 3.
54. Secrest Machine Corp. v. S.S. Tiber, 450 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1972).
55. See Hamburg, supra note 1, at art. 7, § 3.
56. Id. at § 2.
57. See Warsaw, supra note 4, at art. 25.
58. I.L.S. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW § 11.04 (1978).
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there has to be some act, although case law has included the failure
to act.59
Fortunately, the Hamburg Rules contain a much better provi-
sion which states that the carrier will be liable without limit if it is
proved that the loss, damage or delay in delivery resulted from "an
act or omission of the carrier done with the intent to cause such
loss, damage or delay, or recklessly and with knowledge that such
loss, damage or delay would probably result." 00 This rule, of course,
equates the sins of omission and commission. Further, Hamburg, by
stating that a servant's reckless acts committed with knowledge that
damage would probably result are included in this category, seems
to be a codification of some of the better Warsaw Convention case
law definitions of "willful misconduct" as meaning a "reckless dis-
regard of the consequences," as opposed t6 a deliberate intent to do
harm or damage.,1
Hamburg further provides that a servant or agent of the carrier
will not be entitled to limit his liability
if it is proved that the loss, damage or delay in delivery resulted
from an act or omission of such servant or agent, done with the
intent to cause such loss, damage or delay, or recklessly and with
knowledge that such loss, damage or delay would probably re-
sult. 2
A serious problem is engendered by the language just stated. Why
the distinction between the act or omission of the carrier, as
contrasted with the act or omission of a servant or an agent? If most
carriers are incorporated under the laws of their respective countries,
they may act only through their servants or agents. If that is so, why
the artificial distinction between the act of the servants and the act
of the carrier when the carrier can only act through its selvants?
It is submitted that the answer is primarily historical, rather than
logical, in nature. The Hague Rules (COGSA) stress that the carrier
will not be liable for the negligence of the crew, provided that it used
due diligence in furnishing a seaworthy ship."' The Hague Rules
(COGSA) contain no provision imposing unlimited liability upon the
carrier for its own intentional misconduct or for the intentional
59. Id.
60. See Hamburg, supra note 1, at art. 8.
61. See note 45 supra.
62. See Hamburg, supra note 1, at art. 8, § 2.
63. See COGSA, supra note 3, at § 1304.
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misconduct of the crew. The polestar thrust of the Hague Rules
(COGSA) is protection of the carrier, while the polestar thrust of
the Hamburg Rules is the protection of the shipper.
This latter distinction between the acts of the carrier and the
acts of the servants or agents is related to the preceding Article.
6 4
Hamburg indicates that the carrier will be liable for the acts of its
servants, who will also be liable if they act within the scope of their
employment. If the servants, however, act in an intentional or reck-
less manner, there is an implication that they are not acting within
the scope of their employment, and the carrier would therefore be
liable, at most, for the limited amounts set forth in Hamburg,6 5 for
the carrier could not prove that he and his servants took all measures
that could reasonably be required to avoid the loss.
It is submitted that the Hamburg approach could lead to the
following result in a case of the theft of cargo by a member of the
crew: the crew member is liable for the full amount of the theft (an
illusory remedy) while the carrier is liable only for the limited amounts
prescribed in Hamburg. This means that carriers can ignore internal
theft risks beyond Hamburg's modest limits even though theft is one
of the most common causes of loss. Today the perils of the sea are
really the perils of pilfering.
In this sense, Hamburg has ignored reality. The problem was
solved very nicely in the Warsaw Convention, which states that the
carrier will be liable without limitation if the damage was caused
by an agent of the carrier acting within the scope of his employment
by willful misconduct or by such default on his part as to constitute
willful misconduct.66 The Warsaw Convention draws this artificial
distinction between carrier liability and agent liability, but at the
same time, it clearly makes the carrier liable for the acts of the ser-
vant.67
Warsaw-Hague provides:
The linits of liability . . . shall not apply if it is proved that the
damage resulted from an act or omission of the carrier, his ser-
vants or agents, done with intent to cause damage or recklessly
and with knowledge that damage would probably result; provided
that, in the case of such act or omission of a servant or agent, it is
64. See Hamburg, supra note 1, at art. 7, §§ 2 and 3.
65. Id. at art. 5.
66. See Warsaw, supra note 4, at art. 25.
67. Id.
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also proved that he was acting within the scope of his employ-
ment.61
The above language is almost accurately repeated in Hamburg, with
the exception of the language referring to his "servants or agents." 69
Let us try to compare the effect of the different language in two
hypothetical cases. A servant of an airline while handling cargo sees
that a bulldozer in the process of backing up is going to overrun and
destroy the shipper's goods. The servant does nothing to warn the
bulldozer operator, and the goods are destroyed. The airline would
be liable for the full amount of the value of the goods because of
the reckless omission of the servant. In the second case, the same
facts occur while the goods are in the hands of the sbipline; the
shipline would be liable only for the reduced amounts set by Ham-
burg. Now, this different result for exactly the same act (or failure
to act) does not make much sense. Distinctions made because of
different risks-risks of the air as compared with risks of the seas-
would be justifiable; but distinctions based solely upon the status of
the employer seem indefensible. It is regrettable that Hamburg did
not faithfully copy Warsaw-Hague in this respect.
The Hague Rules (COGSA) provide that the term "goods," does
not include cargo "which by the contract of carriage is stated as be-
ing carried on deck and is so carried." 71 Case law under this provi-
sion has held that if the bill of lading states that the goods may be
carried on deck and they were, in fact, so carried on deck, then the
protection of the Hague Rules (COGSA) would still govern this
deck cargo.7' The Hamburg Rules have attempted to codify much
of this case law by providing that the carrier is entitled to carry the
goods "on deck only if such carriage is in accordance with an agree-
ment with the shipper or with the usage of the particular trade or
is required by statutory rules or regulations." 2  Hamburg goes on
to provide that if the carrier and the shipper have agreed that the
goods shall or may be carried on deck, the carrier must insert a
statement to that effect in the bill of lading or other document evi-
dencing the contract of carriage by sea. In the absence of such a
statement, the carrier has the burden of proving that an agreement
for deck carriage has been negotiated.
68. See Warsaw-Hague, supra note 5, at art. 25.
69. See Hamburg, supra note 1, at art. 8, § 1.
70. See COOSA, supra note 3, at § 1301(c).
71. Id.; G. GILMORE AND C.L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMiRALTY 180-83
(2d ed. 1975).
72. See Hamburg, supra note 1, at art. 9, § 1.
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The carrier is not entitled to invoke such an agreement against
a third party, including a consignee, who has acquired a bill of lading
in good faith. In the event that the carrier improperly carries the
goods on deck, the carrier is liable for loss of or damage to the goods
as well as for delay in delivery "resulting solely from the carriage on
deck." " The liability of the carrier is to be determined in accordance
with the provisions of Article 6 or Article 8, as the case may be.
Article 9 provides, in what appears to be an afterthought, that
"[c]arriage of goods on deck contrary to express agreement for car-
riage under deck is deemed to be an act or omission of the carrier
within the meaning of art. 8." 7' Of course, this breach of an express
agreement is to be equated with an intentional disregard of the rights
of the shipper, and unlimited liability would, therefore, be imposed
upon the carrier. The overall effect of Article Nine's treatment of
deck cargo would seem to be that unless there is an express agree-
ment between shipper and carrier for underdeck carriage, the shipper
can place the cargo on deck and not lose the limits of liability as
provided. It is, therefore, wise for shippers who are concerned with
this situation to draft express agreements that the cargo must be
carried under deck.
The phrase "or with the usage of the particular trade"' would
seem to govern the container industry, and thus include container
ships which are designed primarily to carry containers. It could now
be alleged, in light of this practice, that in the container trade, deck
carriage would be within the meaning of this provision.
LiABmLTy OF THE CARRIER AND AcTuAL CAnneR
The Hamburg Rules draw a distinction between the notion of a
"carrier" and an "actual carrier." A carrier is defined to mean "any
person by whom or in whose name a contract of carriage of goods
by sea has been concluded with a shipper." " An actual carrier, on
the other hand, is defined to mean "any person to whom the perfor-
mance of the carriage of the goods, or of part of the carriage, has been
entrusted by the carrier, and includes any other person to whom such
performance has been entrusted." 77  Analyzing these two concepts
73. Id. at § 3.
74. Id. at § 4.
75. Id. at § 1.
76. Id. at art. 1, § 1.
77. Id. at § 2.
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together, the carrier might well be a freight forwarder through
whom a contract of carriage was entered into with an actual carrier
for carriage of goods by sea from one port to another. Hamburg
further develops this scheme by providing that when the shipper has
entrusted his goods to a carrier who in turn has entered into a con-
tract with the actual carrier, the carrier (such as the freight for-
warder) is responsible for the carriage of the goods by the actual
carrier, and is jointly and severally liable with the actual carrier to
the shipper. 8 However, the section points out that where both the
carrier and the actual carrier are liable, their liability is joint and
several, but their total liability shall not exceed the limits of liability
provided for in this Convention.-, If the carrier is found liable to
the shipper for some omission or commission of the actual carrier, the
carrier should be able to recover from the actual carrier since it is
provided that "nothing in this Article shall prejudice any right of
recovery as between the carrier and the actual carrier."8s0
The carrier is given a way to avoid the imposition of liability
for the wrongful acts of the actual carrier.8 ' If the contract of car-
riage expressly provides that a specified part of the carriage is to be
performed "by a named person other than the carrier," the contract
may also state that the carrier is not liable for loss, damage or delay
in delivery caused during the time the goods are in the hands of
the actual carrier. This exonerating clause will be ineffective, how-
ever, if the aggrieved shipper is unable to obtain jurisdiction over
the actual carrier under the Hamburg Rules."
Articles 10 and 11 of Hamburg are an interesting hodge-podge
of somewhat conflicting notions as to the liability of the initial car-
rier for acts of subsequent, actual carriers. Ordinarily, the initial
carrier will remain liable for any acts of omission or commission by
the actual carrier. This view is consistent with Section 7-302 of the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and the U.S. federal law, 3 but
is contradicted when the initial carrier is astute enough to name the
actual carrier and to provide that it (the initial carrier) will not be
liable for the acts of the actual carrier unless jurisdiction cannot be
obtained over the actual carrier.
78. Id. at art. 10.
79. Id. at § 10.
80. Id. at § 6.
81. Id. at art. 11.
82. Id. at art. 21.
83. 49 U.S.C. § 20, para. 11 (1970).
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Inasmuch as Article 11 uses the singular expressions carrier and
actual carrier, one wonders what the courts will do if the through-
carriage bill of lading provides for two or more actual carriers, and
the loss or damage occurs during the transport by one of them, or
if damages occur on both ships. It would seem that the courts, in
this instance, ought to extend the reach of Article 11 (and Article 10)
beyond the first actual carrier.
BnLs oF LADING
The Hamburg Rules attempt to define the bill of lading by say-
ing that it is a document which:
evidences a contract of carriage by sea and the taking over or
loading of the goods by the carrier, and by which the carrier un-
dertakes to deliver the goods against surrender of the document.
A provision in the document that the goods are to be delivered to
the order of the named person, or to order or to bearer, constitutes
such an undertaking 8 4 (emphasis added).
The emphasized portions above indicate that all bills of lading must
be in negotiable form, and that there could not be a so-called
straight or non-negotiable bill of lading. On the other hand, Article
15, which articulates the essential items to be placed in the bill of
lading, does not clearly indicate that the bill of lading must be "to
order." It does say that the name of the consignee must be given
if stated by the shipper, but then in an afterthought approach, pro-
vides that the bill of lading must meet the requirements set out above,
which again seems to require that the bill of lading must be issued
in negotiable form.8
The Hamburg Rules have avoided some of the mistakes of the
original Warsaw Convention, which also requires that a large num-
ber of items be stated in the bill of lading."8 Warsaw provides that
if the carrier fails to set out all of these particulars, it will not be
entitled to avail itself of the limitation of liability provisions. It
appears that the Hamburg draftsmen somewhat followed the ap-
proach of the draftsmen of the 1955 Hague amendments to the
Warsaw Convention, which eliminated all of the required statements
on the airway bill, with the exception that the bill must contain a
statement that the transportation may be covered by the Warsaw
84. See Hamburg, supra note 1, at art. 1, § 7.
85. Id. at art. 15, § 3.
86. See Warsaw, supra note 4, at arts. 8 and 9.
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Convention and that the Convention limits the liability of carriers
with respect to loss or damage to cargo. Under the Hamburg Rules,
if one or more of these so-called required items are left out of the
bill of lading, the rules provide that:
It]he absence in the bill of lading of one or more particulars re-
ferred to in this Article does not affect the legal character of the
document as a bill of lading provided that it nevertheless meets
the requirements set out in para. 7 of art. 1.8
7
Therefore, there appears to be no real sanction for a failure to abide
by Article 15, except for the apparently required negotiable form of
the bill of lading.
Hamburg incorporates modem-day commercial practice by pro-
viding for the "on-board" or "shipped" bill of lading, wherein a carrier
which takes possession of the goods and then subsequently loads them
must, at the request of the shipper, issue a shipped or on-board bill
of lading showing that the goods have actually been placed on board
the vessel."" This practice is required in most letters of credit wherein
bankers insist that they will not honor a draft accompanied by a
received bill of lading, as distinguished from a shipped or on-board
bill of lading.' The same subsection wisely provides that the ship
may amend a previously issued bill of lading by noting (perhaps by
a rubber stamp) that the goods have been loaded on board the vessel.
EVIDENTIARY EFFECT OF BLLs OF LADiNG
COGSA includes only slender coverage of the question as to
what reservation or what statements are to be placed in bills of
lading by carriers when they are unable to ascertain the contents of
packages.'.. The Hamburg Rules enlarge these COGSA Rules, and
they seem to bear a resemblance to the American Pomerene Act 9
provisions and Section 7-301 of the UCC. Under Hamburg, if the
prepared bill of lading (i.e., prepared by a shipper) states particulars
about which the carrier has doubts, or if he has no reasonable means
of checking such particulars, the carrier or such other person must
insert a reservation in the bill of lading specifying these inaccuracies,
87. See Hamburg, supra note 1, at art. 15, § 3.
88. Id. at § 2.
89. Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits, art. 20(a)
(1974); H.C. GUTTERIDGE AND M. MEGRAH, THE LAW oF BANKER'S COMMER-
CrL CREDITS 93, 94, 112 (1976).
90. See COGSA, spra note 3, at § 1303.
91. 49 U.S.C. § 101 (1970). This should not be confused with the Webb-
Pomerene Act.
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grounds of suspicion, or the absence of reasonable means of checking
such inaccuracies or suspicions. If the carrier which issues the bill
of lading fails to make this reservation on the bill of lading, it is
"deemed to have noted on the bill of lading that the goods were in
apparent good condition." 92
This provision seems to reflect a modem-day commercial practice
which is exemplified by the case law .1 3 If a clean bill of lading has
been issued, prima facie evidence of the taking over of the goods by
the carrier and proof to the contrary by the carrier is not admissible
"if the bill of lading has been transferred to a third party, including
a consignee, who in good faith has acted in reliance on the description
of the goods therein.""' It is to be noted that the use of the word
consignee here indicates that it is proper to issue a non-negotiable
bill of lading, but again the answer is not clear in light of the prior
discussion.
Hamburg puts the onus on the carrier of stating who is to pay
for the freight and for demurrage, if any." If there is no indication
that the consignee is to pay these costs, it is prima facie evidence that
no freight or demurrage is payable by the consignee. However,
proof to the contrary by the carrier is not admissible when the
bill of lading has been transferred to a third party, including a
consignee, who in good faith has acted in reliance on the absence
in the bill of lading of any such indication.9 6
Again, this indicates that a non-negotiable bill of lading might be
proper under the Convention.
The word consignee is defined to mean "the person entitled to
take delivery of the goods." ' This definition could be used in the
sense of a named consignee in a straight bill of lading, or the "order
party" in a negotiable bill of lading. In light of the wording of
Article 15(1)(e), which states that the bill of lading must contain
"the consignee if named by the shipper," the wording of Subsection
6, Article 1,"' and the definition of consignee in Article 1(4)," the
92. See Hamburg, supra note 1, at art. 16.
93. C.M. SCHMITTOFF, THE EXPORT TRADE 322-26 (6th ed. 1975).
94. See Hamburg, supra note 1, at art. 16, § 3(b).
95. Id. at § 4.
96. Id.
97. Id. at art. 1, § 4.
98. Id. at art. 1, § 6 provides: "'Contract of carriage by sea' means any
contract whereby the carrier undertakes against payment of freight to carry
goods by sea from one port to another . . ."
99. See note 97 supra and accompanying text.
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word consignee should not be interpreted as signifying that a non-
negotiable bill of lading is permissible. On the other hand, Article
18, which will be discussed shortly, casts some doubt on this argument.
The Hamburg Rules, after stressing the importance of the issuance
of bills of lading, interjects a foreign note:
Where a carrier issues a document other than a bill of lading to
evidence the receipt of the goods to be carried, such a document
is prima facie evidence of the conclusion of the contract of car-
riage by sea and the taking over by the carrier of the goods as
therein described. 00
This provision spawns a number of questions:
(1) Does this provision authorize a carrier to issue "a document
other than a bill of lading"-such as a dock receipt ' 01 -in lieu of a
bill of lading? Such a practice would be a dramatic change from the
normal course of current practice in maritime transactions." 2
(2) Does the phrase prima facie mean that a carrier would be
able to legally deny its own receipt of goods as evidenced by its
dock receipt? The carrier may not impeach its own bill of lading
when it has been transferred to a third party, "including a consignee,
who in good faith has acted in reliance on the description of the goods
therein." 103 Would the same rule prevail if the "dock receipt" (or
a similar carrier-issued document) were transferred to a bona fide
purchaser for value? The answer is not clear.
(3) Must or should this "document" recite all of the requirements
for a bill of lading as itemized in Article 15? For example, "the car-
rier may amend any previously issued document in order to meet the
shipper's demand for a 'shipped' bill of lading if, as amended, such
document includes all the information required to be contained in a
'shipped' bill of lading." '04 This sentence contains the negative im-
plication that the "other document" of title must state all of the re-
quirements of Article 15 only if it is to be amended into a shipped
bill of lading, rather than be exchanged for the issuance of the first
bill of lading.
100. See Hamburg, supra note 1, at art. 18.
101. See Murray, The Delivery Order in America/and English Commercial
Law, 82 Com. L. J. 205 (1977).
102. See COGSA, supra note 3, at §§ 3, 5, 6, 11, 13.
103. See Hamburg, supra note 1, at art. 16, § 3.
104. Id. at art. 15, § 2.
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(4) The words "such a document is prima facie evidence of the
conclusion of the contract of carriage by sea" " would, by the use
of the word "conclusion," seem to mean the "execution" of the con-
tract, in the sense of entering into it, rather than the performance
of the contract. In this regard, should the wording of Subsection 3
of Article 23 have any bearing? This subsection states:
[Wihere a bill of lading or any other document evidencing the
contract of carriage by sea is issued, it must contain a statement
that the carriage is subject to the provisions of this Convention
which nullify any stipulation derogating therefrom to the detri-
ment of the shipper or the consignee.106
Under this latter rule, any "dock receipt" or other document issued
by the ship would have to contain this reference to the Hamburg
Convention, or the ship could incur the sanction provided for in the
next succeeding subsection which imposes liability upon the ship
when the shipper or consignee has suffered loss as the result of the
omission of this statement.
(5) Must this document (dock receipt, etc.) be in negotiable
form? If the document may be used in lieu of a bill of lading, it
would be incongruous for a court to say that it need not be in nego-
tiable form (assuming, as previously discussed, that bills of lading
should or must be in negotiable form). On the other hand, it could
be argued that bills of lading and this "other" document are distinct
documents, and if a ship has chosen to issue this "other" document,
it ought to stand on its own bottom and not be controlled by the
requirements of a separate document. Of course, so long as most
international sales contracts continue to insist upon "on-board bills
of lading," the problems presented by Article 18 will most likely re-
main of mere academic interest.
GUARANTEES BY THfE SHIPPER
Consistent with COGSA, the Hamburg Rules provide that when
the shipper describes the goods and these descriptions are used in the
bill of lading, the shipper guarantees the accuracy of these particu-
lars and remains liable, even if the bill of lading has been transferred
by him.'0 7 Of course, the fact that the shipper is to indemnify the
carrier in no way limits the liability of the carrier to any person other
105. Id. at art. 18.
106. Id. at art. 23, § 3.
107. Id. at art. 17, § 1.
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than the shipper. Hamburg takes cognizance of the infamous prac-
tice of some shippers and carriers whereby the shipper will induce
the carrier not to clause the bill of lading (by showing something is
wrong with the goods) by a promise of the shipper to indemnify or
protect the ship in the event it is sued by a consignee or a holder in
due course of the bill of lading."' 8 If the ship should issue a clean
bill of lading and ignore particulars furnished to it by the shipper,
or should ignore the apparent condition of the goods because of a
letter of guarantee to indemnify by the shipper, this contract is void
and of no effect as against any third party, including a consignee, to
whom the bill of lading has been transferred."0 This Article is rather
awkward because it provides that such a letter of guarantee or agree-
ment is valid as against the shipper unless the carrier or the person
acting on his behalf, by omitting a reservation as to the condition
of the goods, "intends to defraud a third party including a consignee,
who acts in reliance on the description of the goods in the bill of
lading."1,o It would seem that in any case where a carrier acts in
reliance on this letter of guarantee or agreement, that there must be
fraud by the ship, otherwise there is no reason to issue a clean bill
of lading.
On the other hand, a court might be reluctant to label the par-
ticular conduct of the carrier as being fraudulent, and one wonders
why the draftsmen did not use the term "design to mislead" rather
than the somewhat odious term "defraud." It is much easier to say
that the carrier intended to mislead a consignee or a good faith holder
of the bill of lading, but it is something else again to say that the
carrier was guilty of deliberate fraud. This same subsection goes on
to provide that if the omitted reservation relates to particulars fur-
nished by the shipper for insertion in the bill of lading, the carrier
has no right of indemnity from the shipper. It appears that the in-
demnification agreement is not valid between the shipper and the
carrier when the carrier intends to defraud a third party. Such a
situation would lead to a result where the carrier would be liable to
the third party with no right of indemnity from the shipper. Ham-
burg seems to say that where the carrier intends to defraud the third
party, the carrier "is liable, without the benefit of the limitation of
liability provided for in this Convention, for the loss incurred by a
108. See, e.g., Hellenic Lines Limited v. Chemaleum Corp., 36 App. Div.
2d 944 (1971).
109. See Hamburg, supra note 1, at art. 17, § 2.
110. Id. at § 3.
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third party, including a consignee, because he has acted in reliance
on the description of the goods in the bill of lading.""'
NOTICE OF Loss OR DAMAGE
Under COGSA, the consignee, or the receiver of goods, must
give the carrier written notice before, or at the time of delivery, of
damage to the goods in the case of patent damage, and if this is not
done, the removal of the goods "shall be prima facie evidence of the
delivery by the carrier of the goods as described in the bill of lad-
ing." 112 In other words, the uncomplaining removal is prima facie
evidence that the goods were received in good order. COGSA further
provides that if the loss or damage is not apparent, notice must be
given within three days of the delivery." 3
These restrictive periods for giving notice have been slightly
enlarged by Hamburg. In the case of patent damage, written notice
must be given to the carrier no later than the working day after the
day when the goods were transferred to the consignee, and if this is
not done, such handing over is prima facie evidence of delivery by
the carrier of the goods in good condition. 1  In the case of latent
damage, the notice in writing must be given within fifteen consecu-
tive days after the day when the goods were delivered to the con-
signee.11 ' If at the time the goods were handed over a joint survey
or inspection by the parties was made, then the written notice re-
quirement is unnecessary.1"' In case of delay, written notice must
be given within sixty consecutive days after the day when the goods
were transferred to the consignee. 1 7 This consecutive day provision
wisely eliminates the question of how to count days, holidays, and
weekends. In the event that the ship claims that the goods caused
harm to the ship, then the ship must give notice no later than ninety
consecutive days after the occurrence of such loss or damage, or after
the delivery of the goods, whichever is later. The failure by the ship
to give notice is prima facie evidence that the carrier has sustained
no loss as a result of the fault or neglect of the shipper."1
111. Id. at § 4.
112. See COGSA, supra note 3, at § 1303(6).
113. Id.
114. See Hamburg, supra note 1, at art. 19, § 1.
115. Id. at § 2.
116. Id. at § 3.
117. Id. at § 5.
118. Id. at § 7.
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It is interesting to note that Article 19 is in many respects much
ado about nothing, because the only serious sanction for a failure to
give the required written notice is that no compensation shall be
payable for delay unless the written notice is given within sixty days." 9
This "lack of teeth" provision parallels the COGSA Rule.'2" There
is no sanction for other failure to give the written notice in the case
of latent or patent damage, or in the case that the ship maintains that
the carrier's goods have caused harm to the ship. The real stumbling
block is presented by Article 20, the limitation of actions section, to
be discussed below.
LIMITATION OF AcTIONS
COGSA provides for a one-year limitation period.'2' The Ham-
burg Rules, on the other hand, wisely enlarge this one-year period to
two years, and also provide that the limitation period covers both
judicial and arbitral proceedings during the two-year period. 22 Case
law in America and England has differed as to whether arbitration
proceedings are within the COGSA one-year limit, with the American
courts taking the view that it does not apply to arbitration proceed-
ings, while the English courts follow the opposite view.22 Under the
Hamburg Rules, this conflict will no longer prevail.
Hamburg's provisions are interestingly intertwined in that Article
20, Subsection 2 states that the limitation period commences on the
day of delivery, while Article 20, Subsection 3 provides that the day
on which the limitation period commences is not included in the
period. In this rather awkward fashion, these subsections attempt
to say that the first day of the period is not included, but that the
last day of the period is counted. A party may extend the limitation
period against himself; 24 however, it is doubtful that this Subsection
will see much practical use.
The Hamburg Rules provide that an action for indemnity by a
person held liable may be instituted even after the expiration of the
two-year period. 2 " For example, if a consignee should sue the ship
119. See note 17 supra.
120. See COGSA, supra note 3, at § 1303(6).
121. Id.
122. See Hamburg, supra note 1, at art. 20, § 1.
123. NEA Agrex S.A. v. Baltic Shipping Co., Ltd., [1976] 2 Lloyd's List
L.R. 47.
124. See Hamburg, supra note 1, at art. 20, §§ 2, 3, and 4.
125. Id. at § 5.
THE HAMBURG RULES
and the two-year period expires, the ship may sue the shipper provided
that the suit is
instituted within the time allowed by the law of the State where
proceedings are instituted. However, the time allowed shall not
be less than 90 days commencing from the day when the person
instituting such action for indemnity has settled the claim or has
been served with process in the action against himself.128
JUISDICTION
The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act pays virtually no attention to
the concept of jurisdiction for suit, and this omission has been cor-
rected by the Hamburg Rules. 27 Under Hamburg, the plaintiff has
the option to file suit in a court competent within the meaning of the
local law in any of the following places: (a) the principal place of
business, or, in the absence thereof, the habitual residence of the de-
fendant; (b) the place where the contract was made, provided that
the defendant has a place of business, branch, or agency there through
which the contract was made; (c) the port of loading or the port of
discharge; or (d) any additional place designated for that purpose
in the contract of carriage by sea. In light of the transitory nature
of seagoing vessels, and in spite of the limited areas for jurisdiction,
the ship may be arrested in any contracting state, and jurisdiction
will be obtained.'28 However, at the request of the ship owner, the
claimant must remove the action to one of the jurisdictions referred
to above, "but before such removal the defendant must furnish secur-
ity sufficient to ensure payment of any judgment that may subsequently
be awarded to the claimant in the action." 129 In spite of the restrictive
provisions governing jurisdiction, the parties may agree to a different
jurisdiction after a claim has arisen. 30
The doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata are implicitly
recognized by a provision that where a suit has been instituted in a
proper court, or where a judgment has been delivered by such a court,
the plaintiff may not institute a new action between the same parties
on the same grounds unless "the judgment of the court before which
126. Id.
127. Id. at art. 21.
128. Id. at § 2(a).
129. Id.
130. Id. at art. 21, § 1(d) permits the parties to agree in advance as to
jurisdiction, but it is to be an alternative jurisdiction and either party may ignore
it by filing elsewhere as provided in Subsection 1 of Article 21.
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the first action was instituted is not enforceable in the country in
which the new proceedings are instituted." ' It is noted that any
attempt to enforce a judgment is not to be deemed the institution of
a new action for this purpose. By the same token, the removal of an
action to a different court in the same country, or to a court in another
country, is not to be considered as starting a new action."3 '
At the same time of its enactment, COGSA paid no attention to
the then developing concept of arbitration, and this omission has been
rectified by the Hamburg Rules. 3 ' Any agreement to arbitrate must
be in writing, and if the agreement to arbitrate is contained in a
charter party and the bill of lading is issued under the charter party
without any notation of the agreement to arbitrate, the arbitration
agreement will not be binding upon the holder in good faith of the
bill of lading."' The moral is clear, of course, namely, that the bill
of lading should recite that any dispute between the carrier and the
holder of the bill of lading must be submitted to arbitration. The
arbitration proceedings can be instituted at the option of the claimant
in the same geographical areas as stated for jurisdiction in court pro-
ceedings."'
GENERAL AVERAGE
The right of a ship to claim general average 136 is subject to the
general rule that there cannot be any contribution when the peril
arises through the fault of the ship, but the ship and the shipper
may agree in the bill of lading that even though the peril arose from
some fault or negligence of the ship, the ship would still be entitled
to contribution if the ship would not be liable for its fault under a
treaty or statute, provided that the ship owners used due diligence
to make the ship seaworthy.3 7 A typical contractual clause-the so-
called "Jason clause" "5 -reads as follows:
131. Id. at § 4(a).
132. Id. at § 4(b) and (c).
133. Id. at art. 22.
134. Id. at § 2.
135. Id. at § 3.
136. See note 46 supra.
137. Gilmore and Black, supra note 71, at 266-71.
138. The Jason, 225 U.S. 32 (1912). As with the Himalaya Clause, this
type of contractual provision became known by the name of the ship involved
in the action in which the question of the legality or illegality of this provision
was decided.
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In case of accident, danger, damage or disaster before or after
commencement of the voyage resulting from any cause whatever,
whether due to negligence or not for which, or for the conse-
quences of which the carrier is not responsible by statute, contract
or otherwise ... the goods, their owners . .. shall contribute with
the carrier in General Average to the payment of any . . . loss
or expenses of a General Average nature that may be made or
incurred . . .. ( emphasis added).
The "Jason clause" is and was terribly important under COGSA
because of the seventeen exemptions extended to the carrier for the
errors and negligence of its officers and crew. What has Hamburg
done to the Jason clause? Under Hamburg:
1. Nothing in this Convention shall prevent the application of
provisions in the contract of carriage by sea or national law
regarding the adjustment of general average.
2. With the exception of art. 20 [the limitation section], the pro-
visions of this Convention relating to the liability of the car-
rier for loss of or damage to the goods also determine whether
the consignee may refuse contribution in general average and
the liability of the carrier to indemnify the consignee in respect
of any such contribution made or any salvage paid. 119
Inasmuch as the carrier under Hamburg is liable for loss, damage or
delay of goods "unless the carrier proves that he, his servants or agents
took all measures that could reasonably be required to avoid the oc-
currence and its consequences," 140 it would appear that the Jason
Clause will have lost most of its effectiveness.
The general average concept may have continued viability in
fire loss cases when the fire arises from a cause other than the fault
or neglect of the ship, its servants, and agents.' 4 ' In addition, Ham-
burg has preserved the rescue exception to general average: "It]he
carrier is not liable, except in general average, where loss, damage or
delay in delivery resulted from measures to save life or from reason-
able measures to save property at sea."'1 4 2
When the carrier's fault combines with another cause to produce
damage to the goods, the carrier is liable only for that loss caused by
139. See Hamburg, supra note 1, at art. 24.
140. Id. at art. 5, § 1.
141. Id. at § 4.
142. Id. at § 6.
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its fault, 4 ' and it would seem that the carrier would be entitled to
general average to the extent of its non-fault in any particular case.
LABiLrry Limrrs
Under COGSA, the carrier is liable in an amount not exceeding
$500 per package, or "customary freight unit," or the equivalent.144 As
noted by many courts, the term customary freight unit was inserted
by Congress; it does not appear in the original version of the Hague
Rules. " The arbitrary figure of $500 was obviously based upon 100
English pounds, which, at the time of the adoption of COGSA, were
worth $5.00 per pound. The $500 limit for a very valuable container
load of cargo is totally unrealistic, and the Hamburg Rules attempt
to peg the recovery limits based upon calculations by the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, or in the alternative, to the value of gold,
by means of a system remarkably similar to that established in the
Warsaw Convention.
For those countries which are members of the International
Monetary Fund, the liability of the carrier is limited to an amount
equivalent to 835 units of account per package or other shipping unit,
or 2.5 units of account per kilogram of gross weight of the goods lost
or damaged, whichever is the higher. 146 The liability for delay is
limited to an amount equivalent to two and a half times the freight
payable for the goods delayed, but not exceeding the total freight
payable under the contract of carriage of goods by sea.147 The lia-
bility for both loss and delay cannot exceed the prescribed limits of
835 units of account per package or 2.5 units of account per kilogram
of gross weight. 4" In other words, the limitation of liability for both
damage and delay cannot exceed the total limitation for damage.
For those countries which are not members of the International
Monetary Fund, the rules state limits of liability of 12,500 monetary
units per package or other shipping unit or 37.5 monetary units per
kilogram of gross weight of the goods. 149 This monetary unit is equal
to 65.5 milligrams of gold of millesimal fineness 900. The conversion
143. Id. at § 7.
144. See COGSA, supra note 3, at § 1304(5).
145. See, e.g., Falconbridge Nickel Mines Ltd. v. Chemo Shipping, Ltd.,
[1973] 2 Lloyd's List L.R. 469 (Can. Sup. Ct.).
146. See Hamburg, supra note 1, at art. 6, § 1(a).
147. Id. at § 1(b).
148. Id. at § 1(c).
149. Id. at art. 26, § 2.
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of these amounts into national currency is to be governed by the law
of the particular country.60
It is interesting to compare Hamburg's stilted language with that
of the Warsaw Convention:
The sums mentioned above shall be deemed to refer to the French
franc consisting of 652 milligrams of gold at the standard of fine-
ness of nine hundred thousandths. These sums may be converted
into any national currency in round figures.' 5'
It is obvious that the French gold franc has again been used as a
baseline for international settlements. As of the time of the writing
of this article, 835 "units of account" (the Special Drawing Rights of
the International Monetary Fund) were worth $662.77. When one
compares the purchasing power of the American dollar in 1936 with
the purchasing power of the dollar today, it appears that the Hamburg
Rules have reduced the real recovery limits established under COGSA.
Hamburg seemingly overlooks the debasement of currency resulting
from inflation.' 52
One of the principal "failures" of the Hague Rules has been the
judicial difficulty in determining whether a container (which may be
forty feet long by eight feet wide by eight feet high) is to be deemed
a "package" under COGSA."5' One view is that the courts ought to
treat the entire container as one package on the grounds that it pro-
motes uniformity and predictability."' Another view, the "functional
economics test,"'155 proposes that the courts must determine whether
the contents of the container could have feasibly been shipped in the
individual cartons in which they were packaged by the shipper. If
the answer is no, then the burden shifts to the shipper to show why
the container should not be treated as a package. To put it another
way:
[W]here the shipper's own packing units are functional, a pre-
sumption is created that a container is not a "package" which
150. Id. at § 3.
151. See Warsaw, supra note 4, at art. 22, § 4.
152. The American dollar, as of July 1979, was worth 78697 Special Drawing
Rights (SDR) of the International Monetary Fund, 32 INTERNATIONAL STA-
TiSTics (IMF) No. 7, 388-89 (1979).
153. See COGSA, supra note 3, at § 1304(5).
154. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. S.S. Hong Kong Producer, 422 F.2d
7, 20 (2d. Cir. 1969) (Hays, J., dissenting).
155. Royal Typewriter Co. v. M.V. "Kulmerland", 346 F. Supp. 1019 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
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must be overcome by evidence supplied by the carrier that the
parties intended to treat it as such.156
The basic problem was caused by the fact that the draftsmen of
the Hague Rules did not foresee the development of the container
as a method of shipment, nor did they foresee the extent of its world-
wide adoption. The draftsmen of the Hamburg Rules did not suffer
from this disadvantage, but have they properly dealt with the con-
tainer? Hamburg states:
(a) Where a container, pallet or similar article of transport is
used to consolidate goods the package or other shipping
units enumerated in the bill of lading, if issued, or other-
wise in any other document evidencing the contract of car-
riage by sea, as packed in such article of transport are
deemed packages or shipping units. Except as aforesaid that
goods in such article of transport are deemed one shipping
unit.157
Under this definition, it would appear that if the bill of lading
recited "one container, said to contain 500 typewriters," this would
constitute 500 shipping units, but if the bill of lading recited "one
container, said to contain machinery," this would constitute one unit.
It is interesting that this "clear labeling" test of Hamburg was re-
jected under the Hague Rules in the Kulmerland case.158 Although
this new requirement that the bill of lading identify the contents of
the container fosters "uniformity and predictability," it will also foster
theft by employees of the longshoremen, warehousemen, and public
docks because it will tell these persons exactly which containers are
worth looting. The reticence of shippers to describe the goods under
the Hague Rules has not been motivated by any desire to deceive the
carrier, but to deceive potential thieves.
The addition of the notions of "pallet or similar article of trans-
port" adds further complications. For example, if a large forty foot
yacht is carried in a "cradle" on the deck of a ship, is the yacht to be
treated as one unit? In a pre-Hamburg case, it was held that this
yacht was to be treated as one "package.""5 9 If one equates the
156. Royal Typewriter Co. v. M.V. "Kulmerland", 346 F. Supp. 1019 (S.D.N.Y.
1972) (construing Leather's Best Inc. v. The "Mormaclynx", 451 F.2d 800 (2d
Cir. 1971)).
157. See Hamburg, supra note 1, at art. 6, § 2.
158. See note 155 supra.
159. Island Yachts v. Federal Pacific Lakes Line, 345 F. Supp. 889 (N.D. Ill.
1972).
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"cradle" to the "pallet or similar article of transport," the same result
should follow under Hamburg. But note the perhaps incongruous
result: a forty foot container (containing 500 typewriters) will have
500 units worth of damage claims against the ship, while the shipper
of the yacht will have only one unit's claim. The bulk shipper of
small, relatively valuable things can decrease his insurance costs, while
the shipper of another unit of about the same size will have to procure
full insurance coverage and increase his costs.
Under this new pallet definition, how would a court treat a
bundle of twenty-two tin ingots bundled together with steel bands-
is there one unit or twenty-two units? Under the Hague Rules
(COGSA), an American court has held that the twenty-two ingots
were to be deemed one package."' Under Hamburg, there could be
twenty-two units if the bill of lading so described them, and if a court
determines that although no pallet was used, a "similar article of
transport" was used. But was it? What is similar to a pallet Without
it being a pallet? For example, if a large generator (eleven feet seven
inches by seven feet eight inches, and weighing 36,700 pounds) is
temporarily fastened to wooden skids to facilitate shipment, is this
a pallet with the generator being labeled as one unit? A pre-Hamburg
case held that the method of attachment could not convert the
generator into one package, and the case was remanded to determine
the number of customary freight units under COGSA.'0 ' A post-
Hamburg court could hold either way as to whether this wooden skid
was a "pallet or similar article of transport."
One additional puzzle has been created by the use of new terms
in the Convention: how do we treat liquid goods such as oil, latex,
etc.? For example, in a pre-Hamburg case,"'2 liquid latex was shipped
in twenty-four lift-on, lift-off tanks. Each tank was seven feet one
inch long, seven feet nine inches wide, and six feet four inches high.
Each tank carried 2,000 gallons and weighed 12,000 pounds when
loaded. Some of the latex was badly damaged in transit, while a
large quantity disappeared entirely. It was held that these tanks
were more nearly analogous to tanks built into the ship as an integral
part thereof, than packages, even though the bill of lading prepared
160. Primary Industries Corp. v. Barber Lines, [1975] 1 Lloyd's List L.R. 461
(Cir. Ct. N.Y. 1974).
161. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 491 F.2d 960
(9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974).
162. Shinko Bouki Co., Ltd. v. S.S. "Pioneer Moon", 507 F.2d 342 (2d Cir.
1975).
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by the shipper listed the number of packages as being twenty-four
in number. Recovery was given to the shipper based upon the freight
unit basis. The court pointed out that if the latex had been shipped
in fifty-five gallon drums, each drum would be a package. If the latex
had been shipped in tanks which were an integral part of the ship,
there would not be any packages and a freight unit test would be used.
The third possible method was the one used in this case.
How would one approach these facts under the Hamburg "ship-
ping unit" rule? If the latex was shipped in fifty-five one-gallon
drums, the shipper would be entitled to recover 835 units of account
per drum or 2.5 units of account per kilogram of gross weight of the
latex, whichever would be the higher. If the latex should be shipped
in bulk tanks, there would not seem to be any "package" or other
shipping unit, and the award would have to be made on a weight
basis. Lastly, if the latex were shipped in these large removable
tanks, would the court now say that there were twenty-four containers,
meaning a very modest recovery by the shipper, or would the court
hold that the gross weight test is the only proper one when dealing
with large tanks of liquids? If the court found that a "container" in-
cludes "tanks" and the bill of lading described the latex as being in
twenty-four containers, the court could grant a small recovery to the
shipper. The emphasis of the Hamburg Rules on the revelations in
the bill of lading might lead a court to this result. Conversely, if the
court associates the word "container" with non-liquid contents, it
could likely award recovery based on the gross weight of the liquid
latex.
On a more positive note, the Convention provides that if the
article of transport has been lost or damaged, and it is not owned or
supplied by the carrier, it will be deemed one separate shipping
unit.11a
Carriers' Limitations of Liability
COGSA provides that its provisions shall not affect the rights
and duties of carriers under various federal statutes, including those
which relate to the limitation of the liability of the owners of sea-
going vessels. This treaty-deference-to-statute approach is continued
by Hamburg which states: "[lthis Convention does not modify the
rights or duties of the carrier, the actual carrier and their servants
163. See Hamburg, supra note 1, at art. 6, § 2(b).
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and agents, provided for in international conventions or national law
relating to the limitation of liability of owners of seagoing ships."'64
The United States' "national law" limiting the liability of owners
of seagoing vessels provides:
The liability of the owner of any vessel, whether American or
foreign, for any embezzlement, loss, or destruction by any person
of any property, goods, or merchandise shipped or put on board
of such vessel, or for any loss, damage, or injury by collision, or
for any act, matter, or thing, loss, damage, or forfeiture, done,
occasioned, or incurred, without the privity or knowledge of such
owner or owners, shall not, except in the cases provided for in
subsection (b) of this section, exceed the amount or value of the
interest of such owner in such vessel, and her freight then pend-
ing' 6 (emphasis added).
As is well known, this statute has been interpreted to mean that the
phrase "value of the interest of such owner in such vessel" means the
value of the interest of the owner in the vessel after the occurrence
which has caused loss to the cargo interests. 68 For example, if the
ship is not entitled to any pending freight and the ship is a total loss,
the owner of the ship is not liable in any amount to the cargo interests
if the accident or occurrence happened "without the privity or knowl-
edge of such owner or owners" even though COGSA and, now, the
Hamburg Convention state that the ship is liable. In truth, both
COGSA and Hamburg provide a liability ceiling, but the floor of, or
exemption from liability may well be provided for in some parochial
law of the affected nation.
BAGGAGE
COGSA is silent as to the question of baggage or luggage, while
Hamburg provides:
No liability shall arise under the provisions of this Convention
for any loss of or damage to or delay in delivery of luggage for
which the carrier is responsible under any international conven-
tion or national law relating to the carriage of passengers and their
luggage by sea.167
164. Id. at art. 25, § 1.
165. 46 U.S.C. § 183(a) (1970).
166. Gilmore and Black, supra note 71, at 906-08.
167. See Hamburg, supra note 1, at art. 25, § 4.
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Under a federal act of 1871,"'8 the carrier is not liable for the loss of
jewels, watches, trinkets, precious metals, notes and securities, prints,
silks, furs, laces, glass, china, and other goods which are commonly
carried as luggage, whether carried as cargo or as baggage, unless the
passenger (in the case of baggage) gives the carrier a written notice
of the true character and value of the above items. It would appear
that Hamburg would then expressly defer to this older statute in such
a situation.
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
Consistent with COGSA, " the Hamburg Convention provides
that any contractual stipulation attempting to negate the effect of this
Convention shall be null and void, and that the benefit of insurance
clause will also be deemed null and void.170 The carrier may increase
his responsibilities by contract with the shipper,7 1 although it is
doubtful that this particular subsection will see much use. Any bill
of lading issued under Hamburg must contain a statement that the
carriage is subject to the provisions of Hamburg which nullify any
derogatory stipulations. 7 2
This provision must be stated in full in order to appreciate the
rather obscure language:
Where the claimant in respect of the goods has incurred loss as
a result of a stipulation which is null and void -by virtue of the
present Article, or as a result of the omission of the statement
referred to in para. 3 of this Article, the carrier must pay com-
pensation to the extent required in order to give the claimant
compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Conven-
tion for any loss of or damage to the goods as well as for delay
in delivery. The carrier must, in addition, pay compensation for
costs incurred by the claimant for the purpose of exercising 'his
right, provided that costs incurred in the action where the fore-
going provision is invoked are to be determined in accordance
with the law of the State where proceedings are instituted.1 7 3
By virtue of the last sentence of this subsection, it is obvious that the
question of attorneys' fees, expert witness fees, the costs of depositions
168. 46 U.S.C. § 182 (1970).
169. See COGSA, supra note 3, at § 1303(8).
170. See Hamburg, supra note 1, at art. 23, § 1.
171. Id. at § 2.
172. Id. at § 3.
173. Id. at § 4.
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and interrogatories, among other things, would or would not be taxable
as costs depending upon the parochial law of the jurisdiction in which
the case was brought. This seems to fly in the face of the over-
riding commandment that the law ought to be uniform. 4
In a sort of "take it or leave it" attitude, the Hamburg Con-
vention provides that "[n]o reservations may be made to this Conven-
tion,"1 71 and it will not come into force until the first day of the
month following the expiration of one year from the date of deposit
of the twentieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or
accession. 17  States which later become contracting states will be
bound on the first day of the month following the expiration of one
year after they deposit the appropriate contractual instrument.177
In order to revise the Convention, not less than one-third of the
contracting states must make a request for a conference;' 7 however,
in order to revise the monetary amounts, only one-fourth of the con-
tracting states need call for a conference. 179  Any decision by the
conference must be taken by a two-thirds majority of the participating
countries.180 The Convention enjoins that any alteration of the amounts
shall be made merely as a result of a significant change in their real
value. ' It is suggested that with the increase in the value of gold
as compared to paper currencies, any convention in the future may
be concerned with the reduction of the amount as opposed to its
increase.
CONCLUSION
The Hamburg Convention is a rather remarkable document when
one considers that it is the product of the deliberations and conten-
tions of seventy-eight nations whose delegates altered the original
working draft by amendments from the floor. The Rules are not
174. Id. at art. 3. The first sentence of Subsection 4 defies explanation in
speaking about loss as a result of a stipulation which is null and void by virtue
of Article 23. How can there be a loss as a result of a stipulation rather than
as a result of an act of omission or of commission? If the stipulation is null
and void, it has not caused the loss; there must be some other thing which has
done so. This sentence really does not make too much sense.
175. Id. at art. 29.
176. Id. at art. 30, § 1.
177. Id. at § 2.
178. Id. at art. 32, § 1.
179. Id. at art. 33, § 1.
180. Id. at § 3.
181. Id. at § 1.
92 LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
perfect rules but they are, perhaps, the best which could be obtained
in an imperfect world. As with most codifications, the success or
failure of the Rules will be dictated by the judicial reception given
them. Any defects in the Rules can be adjusted by sympathetic, in-
telligent judicial responses, for the defects are not in themselves
fatal.18 2
182. For a delightfully written, rather harsh critique, see Tetley, The Ham-
burg Rules-A Commentary, (pt. 1), LLOYDS' MAR. AND COM. L. Q. (1979).
